Florida Criminal Lawyer Blog

As previously addressed, United States Supreme Court ruled that Van Chester Thompkins’ confession to Michigan police was admissible against him at trial even though he sat silently for nearly three hours during police interrogation prior to his coercion, which some defense observers thought was coerced, according to Broward criminal attorney Moore. The Court held that merely being silent did not unambiguously invoke the Defendant’s right to remain silent, which is protected under the 5th Amendment of the United States Constitution and in the landmark case of Miranda v. Arizona.

Under the 5th Amendment, criminal suspects have the right to remain silent during police interrogation, a particularly important right according to Fort Lauderdale criminal lawyer Moore. Specifically, the 5th amendment states that no person shall be compelled to be a witness against themselves in a criminal trial. The United States Supreme Court has held that prosecutors may not even comment on a suspect’s decision to remain silent or ask a jury to draw a negative inference from a suspect’s decision to remain silent. In Miranda v. Arizona the Supreme Court created a rule designed to protect criminal suspects from making coerced into making statements to the police during an interrogation. According to Miranda, suspects must be warned of their right to remain silent whenever they are in custody and interrogation by police before any of the suspect’s statements can be used against him at trial. Once a criminal suspect is given his Miranda warnings he may then decide whether to invoke their right to remain silent by not answering any questions or waive their Miranda right by speaking with the police. One issue that the Miranda case did not address was what exactly must a suspect do to invoke his right to remain silent.

The Thompkins case presented an interesting question to the courts: does sitting silently without answering any questions mean that a suspect has invoked his right to remain silent? If so, should the state be allowed to use subsequent incriminating statements against the defendant at trial? The state of Michigan argued to the U.S. Supreme Court in its petition that although a suspect may passively convey to officers that they are invoking their right to remain silent by not answering questions, only an unambiguous invocation of the right to remain silent, such as a statement the suspect wants to terminate the interview, would let a reasonable police officer know that the suspect wants all questioning to stop. In its brief the State of Michigan argued that:

“A suspect may want to listen to a recitation of the evidence against him or learn about the benefits of cooperation before deciding whether to exercise his rights. Or a suspect may be formulating an explanation of events that lessens his culpability, planning an alibi, or thinking through his options. Or he may be willing to talk about some topics but not others... Simply presuming an invocation after some initial period of silence... would override the wishes of those suspects who wanted to listen and deliberate further, rather than to end questioning."

A majority of justices of the U.S. Supreme Court agreed with the reasoning of the state of Michigan. They held that only an unambiguous statement of a suspect that he wanted to invoke his right to remain silent and end all question could adequately inform police officers that the suspect wanted all interrogation to end. They compared the defendant's situation to previous cases involving a suspect’s request to speak with a lawyer before answering police questions. In those cases the Supreme Court had held that only a clear and unambiguous statement by a defendant that he wanted a lawyer would require police to stop their interrogation, a position not all criminal defense attorneys would agree with.

A four justice minority disagreed with the majority’s reasoning. In a dissent by Justice Sonia Sotomayor, they stated that it was counterintuitive to require to require suspects to speak in order to invoke their right to remain silent and that the state of Michigan did not present enough evidence to overcome the high burden of proof required by Miranda to show that Thompkins knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived his right to remain silent.

Legal commentators are split on the merits of the Supreme court’s decision in this case. Scholars who have supported the decision have stated that it helps create clear guidelines for police officers about when they must intend interrogation of a criminal suspect. Scholars more sympathetic to the dissenters have stated that the decision does not take into account the concerns of the Supreme Court in Miranda about the pressures of custodial interrogation of criminal suspects.

In a 5-4 decision released this past June, the Supreme Court limited the scope of its prior holding in Miranda v. Arizona and held that a criminal suspect's incriminating statements, made after nearly three hours of silence during police questioning, could be used against him at trial, says Fort Lauderdale criminal lawyer Moore. At issue was whether the suspect's silence while being questioned by police was, by itself, an invocation of his right to remain silent under the 5th amendment and whether his response to police interrogation made after this lengthy period of silence should have been suppressed. The Court held that because the defendant had never explicitly invoked his right to remain silent -- orally, for example -- his incriminating statements made to police interrogators were admissible against him.

The case concerned defendant Van Chester Thompkins, who was accused of shooting another man outside of a shopping mall in Michigan. Police investigators considered Thompkins a suspect in the shooting and brought him in for questioning nearly a year after the shootings had occurred. Prior to questioning Thompkins, the police read him his Miranda warnings, informing him that he had the right to remain silent during interrogation, that anything he said could be used against him in court, that he had the right to an attorney and that one could be provided to him free of charge if he could not afford one. After reading Thompkins his Miranda rights, police officials did not ask him if he formally wanted to waive his rights, but instead began asking him about the shooting. Thompkins was unresponsive for nearly two hours and forty-five minutes of questioning about the incident, says Broward criminal lawyer Moore. He only broke his silence during the interrogation to state that his chair was hard and that he did not want a peppermint that the officers offered him. Police eventually changed course and asked Mr. Thompkins religiously themed questions designed to try to appeal to his belief in God. They asked Thompkins 1) if he believed in God, 2) if he prayed to God and 3) if he prayed to God for shooting the victim. Thompkins answered yes to all three questions. The answer to the third question was used against him at trial after the trial court denied the defendant's motion to suppress the statement because he had invoked his right to remain silent by not answering the officers' questions during the previous part of the interrogation. The issue was then appealed to the Michigan state courts and eventually to the federal courts with the United States Supreme Court ultimately deciding that the statement was admissible at trial and was not a violation of Miranda. In part two of this article we will discuss what kinds of statements are protected under Miranda v. Arizona and why the Supreme Court decided that the defendant's statement was admissible against him at his criminal trial.

The federal court of appeals for the District of Columbia recently took on the issue of the use of Global Positioning System (known as GPS) devices and a defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy in what Broward criminal lawyer William Moore notes was an important case for the development of technological searches. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution forbids unreasonable searches and seizures. In many cases, the law enforcement officers must obtain a warrant to conduct invasive searches. The law enforcement agency did not obtain a warrant, but had suspicions that he was involved in drugs. The placed the GPS tracking device under the bumper of his car, monitoring his comings and goings for several weeks. The defendant was the owner of a nightclub in Washington, D.C.

The defendant was subsequently convicted. However, he challenged the validity of the use of the GPS device to track him, saying that it was too invasive of a search for the government not to need a warrant. The government disagreed for several reasons. First, they argued that the defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy as far as where he drove, as any member of the general public could have followed him to see where he went and when. The government also argued that the use of GPS devices to monitor the subjects of criminal investigations had already, in essence, been dealt with in previous cases and found to be constitutional: the use of beepers, attached to car bumpers, had been found not to be an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment.

The court dismissed the government’s arguments and found that the search was unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, violating the defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy. The court determined that the comparison to beepers was not a persuasive analogy because those were usually used only for very short periods of time; for example, for trailing a suspect from one location to another. They are not generally used to track a suspect’s movements for weeks on end. The court also noted that it is extremely implausible that a member of the public would actually have followed the defendant’s every move for a month.

Evidence obtained as a result of the unlawful search was therefore excluded and the conviction was overturned. But for the illegal search, the government would have been unable to prove its case, notes Fort Lauderdale criminal lawyer Moore.

Continue reading " Broward Criminal Lawyer on Search and Seizure in the Age of Technology " »